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THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: NEW 
PARADIGM OR WOLF IN SHEEP’S 
CLOTHING? 
Meredith Kolsky Lewis* 
Abstract: The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is 
currently negotiating with seven other countries to form a new trade 
agreement called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP has the 
potential to expand into a Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP). At present there are several competing models for Asia-Pacific 
economic integration that exclude the United States entirely. In such an 
environment, the TPP presents the United States with a welcome oppor-
tunity, not only to participate, but also to take a leadership role in estab-
lishing the terms for a region-wide agreement. Nevertheless, the USTR 
must make the TPP sufficiently attractive to other Asia-Pacific economies, 
such that those countries will prefer the TPP over other integration mod-
els. This will require the USTR to partially diverge from its standard FTA 
template and liberalize in new areas. Although doing so may be politically 
challenging, it is the United States’ best strategy if it wishes to solidify a 
role for itself in an economically integrated Asia-Pacific. 
Introduction 
 The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has 
devoted significant resources to negotiating the United States’ acces-
sion to a trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP). Although these negotiations have captured the attention of U.S. 
negotiators, and are well-known to the countries already participating 
in the TPP, the TPP’s existence is not otherwise well-known. As of mid-
2009, mentioning the TPP at international legal academic conferences 
drew mainly blank looks. Correspondingly, there is a dearth of legal 
scholarship on the TPP.1 Nevertheless, although the TPP has slid be-
neath the radar until this point, it should not be ignored any longer. 
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 The TPP is a new type of trade agreement. It does not fit into the 
more common molds of bilateral free trade agreements or plurilateral 
customs unions. Rather, the TPP represents an unprecedented free 
trade agreement (FTA) comprising eight or more members, including 
the United States, and has implications for regionalism—particularly in 
the Pacific Rim—and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and for 
the power dynamics between major trading blocs. The TPP has the po-
tential both to harmonize and to fragment. It reflects both a conver-
gence of economies seeking to form a broader alliance, and a diver-
gence from the multilateral trading system. The TPP has the potential 
to create a new paradigm for trade agreements, to form the basis for a 
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), and to provide an alterna-
tive power center within Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)2 
in ways that are distinct from the models that have been jockeying for 
                                                                                                                      
Trade Agreement into a Broader Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications, Risks and Opportunities, 4 
Asian J. WTO & Int’l Health L. & Pol’y 401, 403 (2009); Yanning Yu, Trade Remedies: 
The Impact on the Proposed Australia—China Free Trade Agreement, 18 Mich. St. J. Int’l L. 267, 
269 n.8 (2010). Most of the available commentary on the TPP is in electronic form and is 
authored by economists, political scientists, think tanks, and NGOs. One exception to this 
is a collection of works edited by Professor Jane Kelsey of the University of Auckland Law 
School. See generally No Ordinary Deal: Unmasking Free Trade and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (Jane Kelsey ed., 2010). Additional information regarding the 
TPP can be found on the TPP-dedicated website created by Professor Kelsey. See Jane Kel-
sey, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)(US-P4+), http://web.me.com/jane_ 
kelsey/Trans-Pacific_Partnership_FTA/Welcome.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). Various 
government websites also provide information regarding the precursor agreement to the 
TPP and the current negotiations. See, e.g., Australia’s Participation in Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship Agreement Negotiations, Austl. Gov’t Dep’t of Foreign Aff. & Trade, http://www. 
dfat.gov.au/trade/fta/tpp/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010); Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
Office of U.S. Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Nov. 15, 2010); 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Aff. & Trade, 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/ 
Trans-Pacific/index.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
2 Cf. N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, The Trans-Pacific Strategic Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreement 1, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/ 
transpacific/transPac-Factsheet-2Mar09.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) [hereinafter N.Z. 
MFAT TPP Factsheet] (P-4 is generally regarded as “a state of the art modern free trade 
agreement” that “could be seen as a model within the Asia-Pacific region”). APEC is an acro-
nym for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, sometimes referred to as four adjectives in 
search of a noun. About APEC, Asia-Pacific Econ. Cooperation ( Jan. 14, 2009), 
http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html. The twenty-one members of APEC are: Austra-
lia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Tai-
wan, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. Member Economies, Asia-Pacific Econ. Coop-
eration (2010), http://www.apec.org/apec/member_economies.html (last visited Nov. 16, 
2010). 
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favor the past several years.3 Nevertheless, if the TPP is not negotiated 
properly, these results are unlikely to materialize. At times, the United 
States has appeared to approach the negotiations as if it were negotiat-
ing just another FTA according to the standard U.S. template. This tac-
tic is contrary to the United States’ long-term interests, however, as it is 
likely to result in an agreement that will not be sufficiently attractive to 
convince other APEC economies to join en masse. 
 In short, the TPP has the potential to be an exceedingly important 
agreement. This Article thus seeks to highlight what the TPP is, why it is 
an agreement to watch, and what negotiating issues will affect whether 
or not the agreement is truly groundbreaking or merely a repackaged 
version of the United States’ existing FTAs. 
I. What Is the TPP? 
 The TPP is a trade agreement—currently under negotiation—that 
has its roots in an existing agreement between Brunei, Chile, New Zea-
land, and Singapore.4 The goal of these original four TPP members 
was not to form a union based on economic synergies among the cur-
rent partners, but rather to create a model agreement that could be 
expanded to include additional members from both sides of the Pa-
cific.5 This is the first non-customs union trade agreement with the 
avowed purpose—and potential—of transforming into a large, plurilat-
eral free trade agreement.6 
                                                                                                                     
 The United States is currently negotiating to join an expanded 
version of the TPP, along with Australia, Peru, and Vietnam.7 An ex-
 
3 See Lewis, supra note 1, at 408. These include: an East Asian FTA comprising China, 
Korea, and Japan; an ASEAN + 3 model, that would see the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) forming an FTA with China, Korea, and Japan; and an ASEAN + 6 mod-
el that would additionally include Australia, New Zealand, and India. Id. 
4 Id. at 403. 
5 Id. 
6 See id. at 403, 404; N.Z. MFAT TPP Factsheet, supra note 2, at 1. 
7 Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Ron Kirk Com-
ments on Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks ( June 18, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/june/ustr-ron-kirk-comments-trans-pacific-partner 
ship-talk. Malaysia has recently committed domestically to seek to join the TPP and is pres-
ently engaging in bilateral discussions with the other participating countries. See TPP Members 
Examine Proposals in Peru, Do Not Reach Final Agreements, 28 Inside U.S. Trade Online (Inside 
Wash. Publishers) (Aug. 27, 2010), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-
Trade-08/27/2010/tpp-members-examine-proposals-in-peru-do-not-reach-final-agree-ments/ 
menu-id-710.html. Canada has also expressed interest in joining. See id. As of late August 
2010, neither country has been invited to participate in the multilateral negotiating rounds. 
See id. It is likely that this invitation will be extended more easily to Malaysia than to Canada, 
due to Canada’s current level of agricultural protection. See id. 
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amination of the USTR’s website reveals a significant amount of infor-
mation about the TPP. In fact, the USTR has set up a separate section 
of its website specifically devoted to this negotiation.8 Although there is 
a great deal of material on the USTR website, it does not provide a 
complete picture of the origins and nature of this agreement.9 
 The USTR website explains that the TPP comprises eight coun-
tries—the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, 
Brunei, Peru, and Vietnam—that have recently decided to form a trade 
agreement.10 The USTR suggests that the Obama administration be-
came interested in forming the TPP after the administration reviewed 
its trade policy strategy in conjunction with members of Congress.11 
The USTR also suggests that the TPP is geared toward obtaining mar-
ket access for U.S. exports.12 Although not technically inaccurate, this 
description of the TPP agreement, how it arose, and the USTR’s expla-
nation of why the United States is seeking to join the TPP, is somewhat 
misleading. The following section sets out a more comprehensive ex-
planation of the TPP, including why the United States may have elected 
to participate in its expansion. 
A. The Genesis of the TPP 
 The USTR website suggests the TPP is a new agreement that does 
not have a precursor. This is not entirely accurate. As noted above, in 
2005, four countries from different corners of the globe—Brunei, Chile, 
New Zealand, and Singapore—entered into a unique and potentially 
path-breaking free trade agreement called the Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Economic Partnership Agreement.13 This agreement was informally 
                                                                                                                      
8 Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 1. 
9 See id. 
10 USTR FACT SHEET: Trans-Pacific Partnership, Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive (Nov. 2009), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/november/ 
ustr-fact-sheet-trans-pacific-partnership. 
11 See Trans-Pacific Partnership: Frequently Asked Questions, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1711 (last visited Nov. 15, 2010); 
USTR FACT SHEET: Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 10; see also Karl Ehlers, U.S. Trade 
Representative’s Office, Remarks at the American Society of International Law’s 104th 
Annual Meeting: International Law in a Time of Change, “Asian Economic Integration—
Reflecting or Reshaping Legal and Economic Realities?” (Pacific Rim Region Interest 
Group Session) (Mar. 25, 2010) (attended by author) (suggesting that the Administra-
tion’s interest was the result of a general review of U.S. trade policy). 
12 See Ehlers, supra note 11; USTR FACT SHEET: Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 10. 
13 See N.Z. MFAT TPP Factsheet, supra note 2, at 1. 
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known as the Trans-Pacific SEP, the P-4 Agreement, or just the P-4.14 
Since the United States joined negotiations, the agreement has become 
more commonly referred to as the TPP.15 
 What is now known as the P-4 Agreement began with negotiations 
launched by Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore at the APEC leaders’ 
summit in 2002.16 These original negotiations contemplated an agree-
ment known as the Pacific Three Closer Economic Partnership (P3 
CEP).17 Nevertheless, Brunei attended several negotiating rounds as an 
observer, and ultimately joined the P-4 Agreement as a “founding 
member.”18 The P-4 Agreement was signed by New Zealand, Chile, and 
Singapore on July 18, 2005, and by Brunei on August 2, 2005, following 
the conclusion of negotiations in June 2005.19 Following the passage of 
implementing legislation, the P-4 Agreement entered into force on dif-
fering dates in 2006 with regard to the various parties.20 
 The P-4 Agreement is the first multi-party free trade agreement 
linking Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America.21 In addition to its geo-
graphic diversity, the P-4 Agreement is interesting because of the com-
prehensiveness and depth of its coverage. Unlike most FTAs, the P-4 
Agreement provides for nearly total liberalization of all goods, including 
agriculture.22 It calls for Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore to reduce 
                                                                                                                      
14 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 1; see History of the Trans-
Pacific SEP Agreement P4, N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Aff. & Trade, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/ 
Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/0-history.php 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010); SICE: Trade Policy Developments: Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 
Org. of Am. States Foreign Trade Info. Sys., http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CHL_ 
Asia/CHL_Asia_e.ASP (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
15 See SICE: Trade Policy Developments: Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 14. 
To avoid confusion, in this article “P-4” will be used to refer to the agreement as originally 
formed, whereas “TPP” will be used to refer to the agreement that the United States is 
negotiating. 
16 Lewis, supra note 1, at 403. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 403–04. 
19 Id. at 404. At the same time, the parties signed a binding Environment Cooperation 
Agreement and a binding Labour Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding. See id. 
20 Id. Brunei only deposited an instrument of provisional application and the Agreement 
has therefore provisionally applied to Brunei since June 2006. Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Lewis, supra note 1, at 415. It is common for FTAs to exclude a significant percent-
age of agricultural products from their coverage. See id. at 415–16; see also Richard H. 
Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 
98 Am. J. Int’l L. 247, 268 (2004) (noting frequent exclusion of agriculture from Euro-
pean Union FTAs); Anna Turinov, Free Trade Agreements in the World Trade Organization: The 
Experience of East Asia and the Japan—Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement, 25 UCLA Pac. 
Basin L.J. 336, 347 (2008) (discussing Asian FTAs). 
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tariffs to zero on all goods by 2017, and for Brunei to reduce tariffs to 
zero on all but a handful of products.23 The P-4 Agreement did not cov-
er financial services or investment, but provided that these areas would 
be negotiated two years after the P-4 Agreement came into force.24 
Those negotiations have substantially completed.25 
 Although the P-4 Agreement is comprehensive in its scope— par-
ticularly now that the financial services and investment negotiations 
have taken place—its uniqueness is more attributable to its structure 
than its content.26 First, although the participating countries are all 
APEC members, the P-4 Agreement deliberately joins countries span-
ning the globe. It creates a strategic linkage that extends to the far cor-
ners of the Pacific, joining Latin America, South East Asia, and Oce-
ania.27 These countries were not motivated by improved access to each 
other’s markets; Singapore already provided duty-free access on all 
goods except alcohol and tobacco,28 and New Zealand maintains very 
few tariffs.29 None of the countries has a particularly large economy or 
population.30 Instead, the parties’ intent was to form a high-standards 
                                                                                                                      
23 See N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, The New Zealand–Singapore–Chile–
Brunei Darussalam Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement 22 (2005), 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/trans-pacificbooklet.pdf [here- 
inafter N.Z. MFAT 2005 Report]. 
24 Id. at 47. 
25 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 1. 
26 Cf. Henry Gao, The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement: High 
Standard or Missed Opportunity? 4–6 (Nov. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/mtg/con09_papers.htm [hereinafter Gao, Trans-
Pacific SEP] (noting the range of goods included in the P-4 Agreement); Trans-Pacific Stra-
tegic Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 1 (highlighting that financial services and 
investment negotiations have occurred). Not everyone is convinced that the P-4 is truly a 
“high-standards” agreement. See Henry Gao, A Scorecard for the P4: Full or Fail?, East Asia 
Forum (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/12/02/a-scorecard-for-the-p4- 
full-or-fail (arguing that the agreement could have phased out tariffs more quickly and 
that its provisions on rules of origin, trade remedies, and services are more restrictive than 
necessary). 
27 See N.Z. MFAT 2005 Report, supra note 23, at 13. 
28 See Gao, Trans-Pacific SEP, supra note 26, at 6. 
29 Trade and the New Zealand Economy: New Zealand’s Tariffs, N.Z. Ministry of Foreign 
Aff. & Trade (Oct. 2005), http://www.mfat.govt.nz/posts/pdf/paris-nztariffs.pdf. 
30 World Development Indicators Database: Gross Domestic Product 2009, PPP, World Bank 
(Sept. 27, 2010) http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_ 
PPP.pdf; World Development Indicators Database: Population 2009, World Bank (Sept. 27, 
2010) http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/POP.pdf. Accord-
ing to World Bank statistics for 2009, New Zealand has a population of 4.3 million; Singapore 
of 5 million; and Brunei of 400,000. Chile has the largest population within the P-4, at 17 
million (all figures rounded). World Development Indicators Database: Population 2009, supra. 
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agreement that could serve as a model for a broader APEC-wide 
agreement, and to which other APEC members could accede.31 
 To facilitate the P-4 Agreement’s potential to serve as an APEC-
wide model or template for an ultimate Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific, the parties included an open accession provision in the P-4.32 
The P-4 Agreement provides that it is open to accession “on terms to be 
agreed among the [p]arties, by any APEC [e]conomy or other 
[s]tate.”33 In theory, FTAs without open accession provisions could be 
expanded upon the agreement of all of the members. Nevertheless, 
this does not tend to happen in practice. Indeed, even in the relatively 
few FTAs that do contain open accession provisions, expansion rarely 
occurs.34 Nonetheless, in the context of the P-4 Agreement, the open 
accession clause is important because the parties’ goal from the begin-
ning was to expand the agreement.35 Therefore, the parties included 
the provision in hopes that like-minded countries would consider join-
ing the agreement, propelling it towards a possible APEC-wide phe-
nomenon. 
 Interestingly, although the P-4 countries included an open acces-
sion provision so that other countries could accede to the P-4 Agree-
ment, it appears that TPP negotiations are not going to entail any new-
comers formally acceding to the P-4 Agreement.36 At a conference 
                                                                                                                      
31 See N.Z. MFAT 2005 Report, supra note 23, at 13. In its official publication on the P-4 
Agreement, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) states that 
“[b]ecause of the low barriers to trade between the partners to the Trans-Pacific SEP, a key 
objective of the negotiations, from the start, was the potential strategic benefits.” Id. at 12–13. 
32 See Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement art. 20.6, Jul. 18-Aug. 2 
2005, Org. Am. States, http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CHL_Asia_e/mainAgreemt_e.pdf 
(accessed through the Organization of American States’ Foreign Trade Information Sys-
tem) [hereinafter Trans-Pacific Partnership]. 
33 Id. Open accession provisions are unusual but not unheard of. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Posed by Free Trade Agreements: Can Open Access Provisions Provide an Es-
cape? 11 Chi. J. Int’l L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 35) (on file with author). The 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contains such a provision, as do a number 
of FTAs among APEC members, including the Thailand–New Zealand FTA and the Thai-
land–Australia FTA. Thailand–New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, Thai.-
N.Z., art. 18.5, Apr. 19, 2005, available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agree- 
ment/thailand/thainzcep-december2004.pdf; Australia–Thailand Free Trade Agreement, 
Austl.-Thai, art. 1905, July 5, 2004, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/ 
treaties/2005/2.html; North American Free Trade Agreement art. 2204, U.S.–Can.–Mex., Dec. 
17, 1992, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpiID=ALL. 
34 Lewis, supra note 33, at 35. 
35 See Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 32, pmbl. See generally Lewis, supra note 33 
(providing a more detailed discussion of open accession provisions). 
36 See Ann Capling, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, East Asia Forum (Nov. 23, 2009), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/23/the-trans-pacific-partnership. 
34 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:27 
session of the 2010 American Society of International Law Annual Meet-
ing, official Karl Ehler made clear that the United States was not acced-
ing to the P-4 Agreement, but rather that a new agreement was being 
negotiated.37 This is consistent with reports from individuals familiar 
with the negotiations.38 Nonetheless, the genesis of the TPP is clearly 
the P-4 Agreement. In addition to the obvious fact that all the P-4 coun-
tries are involved in the TPP negotiations, the P-4 Agreement contains 
the key ingredients that are being sought in the TPP: geographic diver-
sity, a high-standards agreement, and a model for expansion.39 
                                                                                                                     
B. The United States Joins the Party 
 Although the Obama administration presents the TPP as its idea— 
derived after reviewing U.S. trade policy objectives—the United States’ 
substantive involvement actually dates back to the Bush administra-
tion.40 The two-year anniversary of the P-4 Agreement triggered the 
beginning of the negotiations on investment and financial services.41 
The United States expressed interest in joining those negotiations, with 
the ultimate intention of acceding to the P-4 Agreement if terms could 
be agreed upon.42 The P-4 Agreement member countries then entered 
into preliminary negotiations with the United States in early 2008 that 
were intended to lay the groundwork for the United States’ ultimate 
accession.43 Shortly after these negotiations commenced, Australia and 
Peru announced that they also intended to join the P-4 Agreement. 
More recently, Vietnam was identified as an additional planned partici-
 
37 See Ehlers, supra note 11. 
38 See, e.g., Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 1. 
39 See Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 32, pmbl., art. 1.1. 
40 See Ann Capling, Multilateralising PTAs in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Comparison of 
the ASEAN–Australia–NZ FTA and the P4 Agreement, at 8 (United Nations Econ. & Soc. 
Comm’n for Asia & the Pacific, Conference Paper, Asia-Pacific Trade Economists’ Confer-
ence, 2009), available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/mtg/2-2Ann%20Capling.pdf. 
The United States apparently proposed the negotiation of an FTA with Australia, Chile, 
New Zealand, and Singapore back in 1998, with the goal of sparking further trade liberali-
zation within APEC. See id. at 7. Although Australia, Chile, and the United States ultimately 
did not pursue this idea, New Zealand and Singapore went on to negotiate a high-
standards bilateral FTA. See id. 
41 See N.Z. MFAT 2005 Report, supra note 23, at 47. 
42 See Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 1. 
43 See Understanding the TPP—The Path to Expansion, N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Aff. & 
Trade (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-
Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/index.php#UnderstandingTPP. 
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pant.44 Once the United States signaled its intention to join, the 
agreement came to be called the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP.45 
 In September 2008, comprehensive negotiations for the United 
States to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership were launched informally.46 
The first round of formal negotiations was originally scheduled to 
commence in March 2009, with Vietnam expected to join as an ob-
server, and Australia and Peru intending to participate.47 Nevertheless, 
with the intervening change in U.S. administration, the first round of 
negotiations was deferred until the Obama administration conducted a 
general review of U.S. trade policy.48 Accordingly, although the Obama 
administration decided to participate in the negotiations following a 
review of its trade policy, the decision can be seen as an extension of 
Bush administration trade policy. 
C. Why Is the United States Pursuing the TPP? 
 Some scholars have commented that the USTR has not focused 
significant energy on the WTO Doha Round of trade negotiations, but 
instead has treated the TPP agreement as the “only game in town.”49 
Yet it is not obvious why the United States has decided to pursue the 
TPP. Although the USTR suggests that the TPP will expand market ac-
cess and is driven by purely economic considerations, this is at best only 
true in an indirect sense. In reality, the TPP is more significant as a po-
tential Asia-Pacific agreement than as an agreement among the initial 
eight countries.50 
                                                                                                                      
 
44 See id. 
45 See SICE: Trade Policy Developments: Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 14; 
Understanding the TPP---The Path to Expansion, supra note 43. 
46 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Trans-Pac. Partners and U.S. Launch 
FTA Negotiations (Sept. 22, 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trans-pacific-partners-
and-united-states-launch-fta-negotiations. 
47 U.S. Delays TPP Talks to Allow Obama Cabinet Members to Take Office, 27 Inside U.S. Trade 
Online (Inside Wash. Publishers) (Feb. 27, 2009), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade-02/ 
27/2009/us-delays-tpp-talks-to-allow-obama-cabinet-members-to-take-office/menu-id-710.html. 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., Bernard K. Gordon, Obama’s Visit to Indonesia and Australia and the TPP, East 
Asia Forum (May 30, 2010), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/30/obamas-visit-to-
indonesia-and-australia-and-the-tpp/. Indeed it appears that the United States is making no 
significant efforts to conclude the Doha Round any time soon. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer et 
al., Figuring Out the DOHA Round 7, 10–11 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., 2010) available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/dialogue_paper_schott_e.pdf. 
50 See Myron Brilliant, Senior Vice President, Int’l Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
Oral Testimony to the Trade Police Staff Committee, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, 2 (Mar. 4, 2009). Brilliant notes: 
36 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:27 
 The United States’ decision to join the TPP is not driven by the 
market access potential within the current eight parties. Of the TPP 
members or members-to-be, the United States already has FTAs with 
Australia, Chile, Singapore, and Peru.51 Therefore, the United States 
could only form new connections with Vietnam, New Zealand, and 
Brunei. Vietnam is in some ways an attractive potential free trade 
agreement partner for the United States, but Vietnam joined the talks 
only after the United States had signaled its interest. Therefore, Viet-
nam is not driving the United States’ involvement.52 New Zealand has 
long expressed its interest in an FTA with the United States.53 Until the 
                                                                                                                      
While new export opportunities in the seven partners of the TPP negotiations 
. . . may be relatively modest for U.S. companies, . . . [i]f the TPP agreement 
evolves gradually into the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, then the United 
States has the potential to reach into economically significant markets that 
previously have been closed off to us through bilateral negotiations. 
Id. 
51 See Free Trade Agreements, Int’l Trade Admin., http://www.trade.gov/fta (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2010). Indeed, among the eight countries currently negotiating the TPP, there are 
so many existing free trade agreements that there are only eight bilateral combinations that 
are not already covered by existing preferential arrangements: Australia–Peru; Brunei–
United States; Brunei–Peru; Chile–Vietnam; New Zealand–Peru; New Zealand–United States; 
Peru–Vietnam; and Vietnam–United States. John Ravenhill, Extending the TPP: The Political 
Economy of Multilateralization in Asia, at 25 (United Nations Econ. & Soc. Comm’n for Asia 
& the Pacific, Conference Paper, Asia-Pacific Trade Economists’ Conference, 2009), available 
at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/mtg/2-3John%20Ravenhill.pdf. 
52 See generally Data Profile of Vietnam, World Bank (2010), http://www.worldbank.org 
(navigate to “Data” hyperlink; then navigate to “By Country”; then navigate to “Vietnam”); 
Vietnam, Office of the United States Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/ 
countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/vietnam (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (reporting 
that Vietnam has a relatively large population of approximately 86 million, and yet it is 
only the United States’ 45th largest goods market as of 2009). Further, entering a free 
trade agreement that includes Vietnam as a partner would also cause some consternation 
within the United States. Vietnamese shrimp and catfish exports have been the subject of 
antidumping investigations and associated litigation within the United States, resulting in 
the imposition of duties on these products. See generally Sungjoon Cho, A Dual Catastrophe 
of Protectionism, 25 Nw. J. Int’l L. And Bus. 315 (2005); Stephanie Showalter, The United 
States and Rising Shrimp Imports from Asia and Central America: An Economic or Environmental 
Issue?, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 847 (2005); Joshua Startup, From Catfish to Shrimp: How Vietnam 
Learned to Navigate the Waters of “Free Trade” as a Non-Market Economy, 9 Iowa L. Rev. 1963 
(2005). The U.S. industries that filed these petitions are unlikely to be pleased by the 
prospect of Vietnam’s products obtaining improved market access to the United States in 
the form of reduced—and perhaps ultimately removed—tariffs. See Cho, supra, at 315–17. 
53 See United States of America: Country Information, N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Aff. 
& Trade, available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/North-America/United-
States.php. MFAT publicly acknowledges that “[s]ecuring a free trade agreement negotia-
tion with the United States has been a key New Zealand trade objective for more than a 
decade.” Id. 
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TPP, however, New Zealand has largely received the “cold shoulder.”54 
In any case, New Zealand’s market is only four million people and is 
already highly liberalized,55 so it is evident that New Zealand is not the 
driver. That leaves the small state of Brunei, which is also an unlikely 
driving force behind the United States’ interest. 
 The United States clearly sees opportunities beyond the eight cur-
rent parties, and hopes that more countries will join the TPP. Although 
the current TPP partners are not major trading partners of the United 
States, APEC as a whole represents a huge market.56 Therefore, the 
TPP makes a good deal of strategic sense for the United States so long 
as it continues to expand. Nevertheless, the reasons go beyond the 
long-term economic potential of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific; 
the reasons also include a significant geopolitical component. In par-
ticular, the United States has the potential to alter some of the eco-
nomic power dynamics in the Asia-Pacific, which is consistent with 
President Obama’s stated goals of increased U.S. engagement in the 
gio
e—and is pre-
sumably pursuing the TPP for these additional reasons. 
                                                                                                                     
re n. 
 At a major address in Japan in November 2009, President Obama 
promised increased U.S. engagement in all aspects of its relations with 
countries in the Asia-Pacific, proclaiming that he would be “America’s 
first Pacific president” and announcing that the United States would 
participate in negotiations to join the TPP.57 To its credit, the Obama 
Administration appears to recognize the strategic significance the TPP 
could have for the United States—although USTR officials deny the 
agreement has any purpose other than an economic on
 
54 See James M. McCormick, The New Zealand---United States Relationship in the Era of Glo-
balization, in Sovereignty Under Seige? Globalization & New Zealand 213, 216 (Ro-
bert Patman & Chris Rudd eds., 2005). In the past, the United States objected to any sug-
gestion of a free trade agreement with New Zealand because New Zealand refuses to allow 
United States’ nuclear ships into its territorial waters. See id. In recent years, however, the 
United States has softened its stance towards New Zealand with respect to this issue. None-
theless, with a market of only four million people, a highly liberalized economy that is 
open to United States products, and a competitive dairy export sector, it is likely that the 
United States sees few potential gains from an FTA with New Zealand. See id. at 217. 
55 See id. 
56 See Office of U.S. Trade Rep., Exec. Office of the President, 2009 Trade Pol-
icy Agenda and 2008 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the 
Trade Agreements Program 123–24 [hereinafter 2008 Report]. In 2008, the United 
States traded $2.1 trillion in goods, and $287 billion in services, with APEC. See McCor-
mick, supra note 54, at 217. 
57 See President Barack Obama, Remarks at Suntory Hall (Nov. 14, 2009, 10:12 AM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall. 
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II. Implications of TPP Expansion for (Both Sides of) the Pacific 
A. Implications for the United States 
 Twenty years ago, then-Secretary of State James Baker famously 
cautioned that it would be a mistake for the United States to permit “a 
line to be drawn down the middle of the Pacific” with the United States 
on one side, separated from Asian countries on the other.58 Notwith-
standing this warning, we have seen numerous models for economic 
integration in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific that exclude the United 
States from their formulations. ASEAN + 3, ASEAN + 6, and an East 
Asian FTA comprising Japan, Korea, and China, are all different visions 
for deeper regional economic integration, and each has deliberately 
omitted the United States from the equation.59 If the United States 
could succeed in negotiating the TPP—and additionally succeed in sell-
ing the TPP as the basis for broader expansion within APEC—it could 
represent a major step toward achieving President Obama’s goal of en-
gaging with Asia,60 and would erase the line down the middle of the Pa-
cific, which China,61 Japan,62 and perhaps others, might prefer to 
d .raw
                                                                                                                     
63 
 
58 See Jeffrey Bader, Special Assistant to the President, National Security Council, Ad-
dress at the Brookings Institution, Obama Goes to Asia: Understanding the President’s 
Trip, 47 (Nov. 6, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/ 
events/2009/1106_obama_asia/20091106_obama_asia_trip.pdf); Claude Barfield, APEC: 
The Keystone to U.S. Asian Policy, The American (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.american. 
com/archive/2009/november/apec-the-keystone-to-u-s-asian-policy/article_print. 
59 Lewis, supra note 1, at 408–09. For a more detailed analysis of the competing re-
gional economic models, see id. at 408–13. 
60 See Evan A. Feigenbaum, America, Trade, and Asia, Council on Foreign Relations 
(May 14, 2010, 2:12 PM), http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2010/05/14/america-trade-and-asia/ 
(characterizing the TPP as a “modest effort” that will not be sufficient to restore the Unit-
ed States’ historical economic role in Asia). Some, however, doubt whether the TPP will 
significantly enhance the United States’ position in Asia. See id. 
61 See Claude Barfield & Philip I. Levy, Tales of the South Pacific: President Obama and the 
Transpacific Partnership, Int’l Econ. Outlook, Dec. 2009, at 4, available at http://www. 
aei.org/docLib/09-IEO-Dec-g.pdf (suggesting that China appears to prefer the ASEAN + 
3 model to an APEC formulation because APEC includes the United States and Taiwan). 
62 Id. at 7 (noting that Japan’s Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, has advocated for an 
East Asian Community that would appear to exclude the United States). 
63 See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, The 23rd ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting, 
para. 3 (Oct. 7–8, 1991), available at http://www.aseansec.org/6126.htm. This Asia-only focus 
is nothing new. Originally promoted by Malaysia’s then-Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir, 
the idea of an East Asian economic grouping that would exclude the United States has been 
around for the past two decades. See C. Fred Bergsten, The New Asian Challenge, Inst. for 
Int’l Econ., at 2--3 (Mar. 2000), available at http://iie.com/publications/wp/00-4.pdf. 
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 An expanded TPP could lead to a different path toward Asian 
economic integration, which would have neither ASEAN nor the three 
ajo
nts or an East Asian FTA. In particular, an expanded TPP 
ou
inserting itself into what is likely to be the more powerful 
f tw
 Depending on how the expansion is structured, the TPP addition-
ally has the potential to multilateralize some aspects of regionalism,66 
m r East Asian economies as its driver, and which would instead have 
the United States as a central participant.64 
 If the expanded TPP becomes the basis for a Free Trade Area of 
the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), Asian integration will likely develop along 
lines more similar to those envisioned (even if primarily in an aspira-
tional sense) by the members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) than those being contemplated in the context of ASEAN-plus 
arrangeme
w ld lead to a trans-Pacific integration rather than an intra-Asian in-
tegration. 
 The United States’ decision to negotiate to join the TPP is there-
fore quite savvy. By joining the TPP, the United States has the potential 
not only to thwart efforts to shape Asian economic regionalism models 
that exclude it, but, if the TPP expansion is successful and continues, 
the United States will also be a leader and agenda-setter with respect to 
the parameters of a future FTAAP. Further, if the TPP grows into an 
FTAAP, the global economic order would also be altered. At present 
there are three major economic blocs—the Americas, Europe, and 
Asia—and the American bloc is not necessarily the most economically 
powerful among these.65 An Asia-Pacific integration has the potential 
to alter the balance into a two-bloc model comprising Europe and the 
Asia-Pacific, with the latter including Asia, the United States, Oceania, 
and much of South America. Therefore, joining the TPP could help 
the United States play an active role in altering the regional power bal-
ance, thereby 
o o large blocs as opposed to remaining on the wrong side of a di-
vided Pacific. 
                                                                                                                      
64 Claude Barfield & Philip I. Levy, Tales of the South Pacific: President Obama, the Trans-
Pacific Partnership and U.S. Leadership in Asia, Vox ( Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.voxeu.org/ 
inde
ew, inclusive Asian architecture). 
 
x.php?q=node/4533 (arguing that the TPP is an ideal mechanism for the United 
States to assert leadership in the creation of a n
65 See John Ravenhill, A Three Bloc World? The New East Asian Regionalism, 2 Int’l Rela-
tions of the Asia Pac. 167, 170 (2002). 
66 See Ann Capling, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, East Asia Forum (Nov. 23, 2009), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/23/the-trans-pacific-partnership/. Multilateralizing 
regionalism is an important goal, as it could counteract the fragmenting effects of the hun-
dreds of FTAs currently in existence or being negotiated. Richard Baldwin et al., Beyond Tar-
iffs: Multilateralizing Non-Tariff RTA Commitments, in Multi-lateralizing Regionalism: 
40 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:27 
which would help facilitate the creation of an FTAAP. In other words, 
the famous “spaghetti bowl”67 of overlapping and inconsistent FTAs 
proliferating the globe could be partially untangled if a large group of 
countries could agree to a harmonized set of commitments to which 
other countries could accede.68 The TPP—and ultimately an FTAAP— 
has the potential to serve as a model of open regionalism69 and a step-
ping stone toward multilateral trade liberalization, rather than the 
stumbling block that FTAs more commonly present.70 
 By combining a high-standards, comprehensive trade agreement 
with an open accession provision and the United States as a party, the 
TPP has the potential to create a new paradigm for trade agreements. 
Rather than presenting the usual two country model in which both 
countries pick and choose the areas they wish to liberalize, the TPP 
would draw together multiple countries from both sides of the Pacific. 
The TPP has the potential to be far more comprehensive than the aver-
age FTA. With the United States as a party, other countries will be inter-
ested in joining the TPP, and doing so would require significant liberali-
zation commitments. If the TPP were negotiated on these terms, it is 
possible—perhaps even likely—that the TPP would lead to an FTAAP. 
                                                                                                                      
Challenges for the Global Trading System 79–80 (Richard Baldwin & Patrick Lows, 
eds., 2009). This has been the subject of at least one conference: the Conference on Multilat-
eralizing Regionalism, September 10--12, 2007 in Geneva, Switzerland, along with an associ-
ated collection of scholarly articles. See Multi-lateralizing Regionalism, supra, at xiv. 
67 See Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, in The 
Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements 2, 2–3 (AEI Press, 1995). This 
description of FTAs was coined by Jagdish Bhagwati. The spaghetti bowl imagery is used in 
particular to refer to the fact that different agreements apply different rules of origin 
(ROO), resulting in a highly challenging situation for would-be exporters, as they may find 
they need to comply with rules that are inconsistent from one importing country to an-
other. Id. at 3. Inconsistent rules of origin are further fragmenting the world trading sys-
tem; nevertheless, getting the WTO membership to agree to adopt a single, harmonized 
ROO system has not yet been possible. See generally Won-Mog Choi, Defragmenting Frag-
mented Rules of Origin of RTAs: A Building Block to Global Free Trade, 13 J. Int’l Econ. L. 111 
(2010) (providing an analysis of ROO issues in global free trade). 
68 See John Ravenhill, Can the TPP Resolve the ‘Noodle Bowl’ Problem?, East Asia Forum 
(Nov. 26, 2009), http://eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/26/can-the-tpp-resolve-the-noodle-
bowl-problem/ (noting that if TPP expansion were successful, the agreement would have 
the potential to multilateralize the free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region). 
69 Barfield & Levy, supra note 64 (describing the TPP as a potential model of open re-
gionalism). 
70 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential 
Agreements Undermine Free Trade 81–88 (2008); Matthew Schaefer, Ensuring That 
Regional Trade Agreements Complement the WTO System: U.S. Unilateralism a Supplement to WTO 
Initiatives?, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 585, 586 n.4 (2007). 
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B. Implications for the WTO 
 If the TPP does expand in the near future into a larger agreement 
that captures a significant percentage of trans-Pacific trade, it may im-
pact the ability of WTO members to complete the current Doha Round 
of negotiations.71 The nature of this impact could be negative because 
the United States and other TPP members could determine that ex-
panding the TPP is an easier and more fruitful path towards new trade 
liberalization gains than is the multilateral framework. On the other 
hand, the growth of the TPP could have a positive impact on the Doha 
Round. USTR Ron Kirk has indicated that he believes the TPP will 
complement the WTO negotiations.72 Although Kirk did not explain 
his comment, it seems feasible that he is correct. Countries that are not 
currently a part of the TPP discussions may fear that the world is split-
ting into large trading blocs from which they are currently excluded, 
and thus be incentivized to reinvigorate the Doha Round. In particular, 
India and Brazil may determine it is worth giving additional WTO con-
cessions to refocus the United States on the WTO. 
III. Potential Pitfalls for the TPP 
 Although the USTR appears to be enthusiastically pursuing the 
TPP, and the other countries involved in the agreement seem to be si-
milarly motivated, TPP expansion is far from guaranteed. There are a 
number of issues that must be resolved before an expanded TPP can 
become a reality. These issues comprise substantive obstacles in the ne-
gotiating process as well as procedural hurdles that must be addressed 
once an agreement is reached. Moreover, these issues will significantly 
affect whether the TPP will multilateralize trade among APEC mem-
bers, ultimately leading to an FTAAP. Although some scholars have 
suggested that the United States should conclude the TPP negotiations 
by the time it hosts the APEC summit in November 2011,73 this may be 
optimistic given the issues that must be resolved. 
                                                                                                                      
71 See Doug Palmer, Asia Pacific Talks No Threat to DOHA: USTR Kirk, Reuters, Dec. 15, 
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5BE4BD20091215. 
72 Id. 
73 See C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Speech at the Seventh Annual U.S. 
Asia Pacific Council Panel Discussion: Should APEC Focus on Trade Liberalization? (May 6, 
2010) (transcript available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?Research 
ID=1600). 
42 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:27 
A. Substantive Negotiating Challenges 
 In most FTA negotiations there are a number of issues relating to 
substantive coverage that pose challenges to resolve. Although each 
partner stands to benefit from the market access liberalization meas-
ures taken by the trading partner, each partner in turn faces domestic 
opposition to liberalizing its home market for goods and services pro-
duced or supplied domestically.74 The P-4 Agreement was relatively 
unique in being able to overcome some of these obstacles and achieve 
a highly comprehensive agreement, at least with respect to trade in 
goods.75 With the addition of the United States, however, the TPP ne-
gotiations are more typical of many bilateral FTA negotiations.76 Ac-
cordingly, there are a number of potential issues regarding substantive 
matters within the negotiation. This section briefly discusses two of 
these issues: agriculture and intellectual property. 
1. Agriculture 
 The United States has historically refused to liberalize most aspects 
of trade in agriculture in its FTAs,77 yet the P-4 countries have agreed to 
comprehensive removal of tariffs on agricultural products.78 How much 
of its agricultural sector the United States will be willing to include in 
its TPP commitments, is likely to be a significant issue. Roughly half of 
New Zealand’s exports to the United States are agricultural products 
that the United States considers sensitive: primarily dairy, lamb, and 
                                                                                                                      
74 See David A. Gantz, The “Bipartisan Trade Deal,” Trade Promotion Authority and the Fu-
ture of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 28 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 115, 118 (2008); C. O’Neal 
Taylor, Regionalism: The Second-Best Option?, 28 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 155, 173–74 
(2008). Both articles were published as part of a symposium entitled, “The Changing Tide 
of Trade: The Social, Political, and Environmental Implications of Regional Trade Agree-
ments,” hosted by the St. Louis University Public Law Review. 
75 See Deborah K. Elms, From the P4 to the TPP: Explaining Expansion Interests in the 
Asia-Pacific, at 6 (United Nations Econ. & Soc. Comm’n for Asia & the Pacific, Conference 
Paper, Asia-Pacific Trade Economists’ Conference, 2009), available at http://www.unescap. 
org/tid/artnet/mtg/Deborah%20Elms.pdf. 
76 See Ravenhill, supra note 51, at 25. 
77 See Taylor, supra note 74, at 188. At the same time, the United States often insists on 
agricultural market access concessions from its trading partners. For example, the Korea—
United States FTA is unlikely to be presented to Congress until Korea makes new conces-
sions on access to its market for U.S. beef. See Gantz, supra note 74, at 147–48. For a discus-
sion of the general tendency to exclude agriculture from FTAs, see Schaefer, supra note 70, 
at 588–89. 
78 See Elms, supra note 75, at 23 n.71. Chile only committed to removing tariffs imme-
diately on a subset of New Zealand’s dairy exports. The remaining Chilean tariffs are sub-
ject to a twelve year phase-out period. See id. 
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beef.79 The U.S. dairy industry has already reacted with alarm to the 
idea of an agreement that could involve New Zealand dairy products 
gaining improved access to the U.S. market, and thirty senators signed 
a letter to USTR Ron Kirk expressing concern in this regard.80 
 For New Zealand, excluding dairy from the agreement would be a 
very hard sell. Nevertheless, New Zealand has very little to offer the 
United States in exchange for including dairy. In fact, the United States 
may have little to gain from forming an alliance with New Zealand. The 
New Zealand market is already highly liberalized, so there would be 
only minimal gains in the form of improved market access.81 And New 
Zealand is a small market, currently accounting for less than .05% of 
U.S. exports.82 Thus, notwithstanding New Zealand’s long-term goal of 
achieving an FTA with the United States, it may be that New Zealand 
does not have enough to offer the United States, or (admittedly less 
likely) that the United States’ demands will result in insufficient payoffs 
for New Zealand.83 
2. Intellectual Property 
 A second issue that may prove challenging in the negotiations is 
intellectual property protection. The United States generally includes 
provisions in its FTAs that are referred to as “TRIPS-plus” in that they 
provide higher levels of protection than is required by the WTO’s 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agree-
ment.84 This does not pose an issue for countries that already have 
FTAs—including TRIPS-plus provisions—with the United States—such 
as Australia.85 Nevertheless, there are aspects of the Australian—United 
States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) that are inconsistent with the 
United States—Singapore FTA with respect to intellectual property 
protection. For example, the United States—Singapore agreement 
does not prohibit the practice of parallel importation, whereas the 
AUSFTA does prohibit parallel importation.86 
                                                                                                                      
 
79 Ravenhill, supra note 51, at 25. 
80 See Dustin Ensinger, TPP Could Cost U.S. Dairy Farmers Billions, Economy in Crisis 
(Mar. 23, 2010, 2:10 PM), http://www.economyincrisis.org/content/tpp-could-cost-us-dairy- 
farmers-billions. 
81 See id. 
82 Ravenhill, supra note 51, at 25. 
83 See Elms, supra note 75, at 22–25. 
84 See Bhagwati, supra note 70, at 95. 
85 See id. at 80. 
86 See U.S.–Australia Free Trade Agreement art. 17.9(4), U.S.–Austl., May 18, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset_up- 
44 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:27 
 For a small market economy such as New Zealand, permitting par-
allel imports makes good economic sense; indeed, New Zealand allows 
parallel imports in its domestic law and has yet to agree to limit such 
imports in any of its FTAs.87 Presumably the United States will want the 
TPP to include provisions restricting parallel imports, which will be op-
posed at a minimum by New Zealand and Singapore. The AUSFTA also 
imposes restrictions that affect how Australia purchases prescription 
drugs for its public health system.88 It is likely that the United States 
would want New Zealand to make similar changes, which New Zealand 
would oppose.89 
B. Procedural Obstacles Within the United States 
 Even if the USTR succeeds in reaching an agreed-upon text with 
the other seven members of the proposed TPP expansion, it will still 
need for Congress to enact implementing legislation.90 In the United 
States, unless a treaty is self-executing, it will not become enforceable as 
a matter of domestic law until it is implemented via legislation.91 
 Under the United States Constitution, Congress has the authority 
to “regulate commerce with foreign nations.”92 Nevertheless, Congress 
                                                                                                                      
load_file148_5168.pdf; US–Singapore Free Trade Agreement art. 16.7, May, 6, 2003, available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/asset_upload_ 
file708_4036.pdf. 
87 See Elms, supra note 75, at 23 n.72; Parallel Importing in New Zealand, Ministry of 
Econ. Dev. (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.med.govt.nz (navigate to “Regulation” drop-down 
menu; click “International Property Policy” hyperlink; navigate to “Parallel Importing”; 
navigate to “Parallel Importing in New Zealand”). 
88 See Bhagwati, supra note 70, at 80. 
89 See Elms, supra note 75, at 20 n.62. The enforcement of intellectual property rights is 
also likely to be an issue. Chile, Peru, Brunei, and Vietnam have all been placed on the 
United States’ Special 301 watch lists based on perceived deficiencies in their domestic 
enforcement regimes. See id. at 18. 
90 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 48–49 (7th ed. 2008). 
91 See id. This is often referred to as a dualist approach to international and domestic 
law. In contrast some countries have monist systems where international legal commit-
ments are automatically incorporated into domestic law without any need for implement-
ing legislation. See id. at 31–33 (discussing monist and dualist systems). Some argue that 
the United States is a dualist system; others characterize it as a hybrid of both the monist 
and dualist approaches. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Val-
ues 71–72 (1995); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist 
Conception, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 529, 531 (1999). In general, however, when a treaty has terms 
that reflect the need for legislative action, it will not be treated as self-executing. This prin-
ciple was first elaborated in Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829). 
92 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
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has on numerous occasions delegated this authority to the President.93 
When the President holds this authority it is referred to as “fast track 
authority” or “Trade Promotion Authority” (TPA).94 TPA gives the Pres-
ident authority not only to negotiate trade agreements, but also to pre-
sent Congress with treaty text that Congress must then either accept or 
reject in its entirety.95 In other words, Congress does not have the 
power—when the administration is in possession of TPA—to exercise 
line-item vetoes, to filibuster, or to condition acceptance of the bill on 
amendments, riders, provisos, or other conditions.96 
 The President held TPA continuously from 1974 to 1994.97 But 
following the contentiousness surrounding Congressional approval of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act of 1994—the implementing legislation for the 
Marrakesh Agreement creating the WTO—Congress declined to renew 
TPA for eight years.98 The majority-Republican Congress finally ended 
the drought and granted the Bush administration TPA pursuant to the 
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002.99 This Act, which 
expired in 2007, required the administration to engage in consultations 
with Congress, domestic stakeholders, and private sector advisory 
committees throughout the process of negotiating trade agreements.100 
 In the past, U.S. administrations have succeeded in passing trade 
agreements through Congress by virtue of having TPA.101 It is widely 
recognized that in the absence of TPA, it would be extremely difficult 
for any trade agreement legislation to be passed, and thus difficult for 
treaties to come into effect.102 Without TPA, Congress would inevitably 
insist upon redrafting provisions of the agreement texts, and adding to 
and subtracting from the negotiated and agreed to obligations. The 
                                                                                                                      
93 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-08-59, An Analysis of Free Trade 
Agreements and Congressional and Private Sector Consultations Under Trade 
Promotion Authority 7 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0859.pdf 
(discussing history and parameters of Trade Promotion Authority); see, e.g., Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934, 43 Stat. 943 (1934) (first delegation of Congressional authority). 
94 See Gantz, supra note 74, at 117. 
95 See id. at 131–32. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. at 130–31. 
98 Gonzalo Villalta Puig & Georgios Andreou Avgousti, “Ignite a New Era of Global Eco-
nomic Growth Through Free Markets and Free Trade”: The Rejection of Multilateral Trade Liberalisa-
tion by the National Security Strategy of the United States (2002--2006), 16 Int’l. Trade L. & Reg. 
96, 96–97 (2010). 
99 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3813 (2006). 
100 Id. §§ 3804, 3812. 
101 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 93, at 9. 
102 See Gantz, supra note 74, at 153; Taylor, supra note 74, at 162. 
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other party to the agreement is unlikely to agree to renegotiate signifi-
cant portions of the treaty in response to Congress’s demands. Thus as 
a practical matter TPA is seen as all but necessary to get any trade 
agreements enacted.103 Indeed, the Bush administration negotiated a 
number of trade agreements during its last term, including FTAs with 
Korea,104 Panama,105 and Colombia.106 The Panama and Colombia 
agreements have not been submitted to Congress for consideration be-
cause the deals are seen as doomed in the absence of TPA.107 
 Although TPA is of paramount importance, Congress has been 
unwilling to grant the authority since it expired in 2007.108 Moreover, it 
is unlikely that Congress will grant the Obama administration TPA any 
time soon. Democrats in Congress are not on the whole favorably in-
clined toward pursuing a free trade agenda, and wish to see environ-
mental and labor side agreements in any FTA.109  Additionally, in the 
current political environment it is not realistic to think that Republi-
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cans in Congress are going to bestow any power to the Obama admini-
stration that they do not have to. 
 Interestingly, the USTR appears to be following the mandates of 
the previous grant of TPA even though there is no current authority. 
The USTR has been engaging in extensive consultations with Congress 
and interested manufacturing, farming, and other interests.110 It has 
held public question and answer sessions on the internet,111 and has 
been very vocal in its efforts to consult with interested stakeholders.112 
Presumably this is all part of an effort to soften Congress so that it will 
ultimately grant TPA—even if only with respect to the TPP. If Congress 
grants TPA after the negotiations are largely completed—and the grant 
contains the same constraints on the Obama Administration that the 
2002 grant contained—then the USTR has covered itself by fulfilling all 
required consultations. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee Congress 
will grant TPA. Accordingly, this remains a large obstacle.113 
C. Disagreements over the Negotiating Architecture 
 An important question is whether the TPP will be structured to 
serve as a model for an FTAAP, or whether it will instead be based on a 
U.S. bilateral FTA model, which would be much less likely to grow into 
a larger region-wide agreement. 
 Following the second round of negotiations in June 2010, the 
USTR reported that the talks had focused on several negotiating goals, 
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including “determining the architecture for market access negotia-
tions.”114 This determination will significantly impact the nature of any 
final agreement, and the future attractiveness of the TPP to other 
countries. 
 “Determining the architecture for market access negotiations” re-
fers to a difference in approach between the United States, on the one 
hand, and New Zealand, Australia, and Singapore, on the other. Exist-
ing TPP members New Zealand and Singapore, together with the Unit-
ed States’ FTA partner Australia, want to negotiate a unified market ac-
cess schedule.115 This form of schedule would entail reopening the 
market access schedules within the bilateral FTAs already in place 
among various TPP countries.116 Under this system, each member 
would have a single tariff schedule, with each concession applying to all 
TPP members.117 The unified market access schedule approach has the 
benefits of making it more difficult to exclude sensitive sectors and cre-
ating an agreement that is relatively straightforward for new countries to 
accede to, particularly if the agreement included a uniform approach to 
Rules of Origin (ROO).118 This approach would also allow TPP mem-
bers to revisit the exclusions agreed to in their bilateral agreements. For 
example, if the approach shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Singa-
pore were adopted, Australia would have an opportunity to attempt to 
negotiate to have the TPP include sugar.119 Thus, adopting a unified 
market access schedule would lead to a more comprehensive and uni-
form agreement than the United States’ preferred alternative. 
 Instead, the United States has taken the position that its negotia-
tions should be on a bilateral basis with the TPP players with which it 
does not currently have FTAs: namely, New Zealand, Vietnam, and 
Brunei. Additionally, the United States has maintained that for those 
countries with which it currently has FTAs the terms of those FTAs 
should apply in the TPP context.120 This would mean that the market 
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access schedules in the bilateral agreements would not be reopened 
but would instead be kept intact within the TPP.121 Such an approach 
would have significant ramifications for the participating countries. For 
Australia, it would mean that the United States-required carve out of 
sugar in the AUSFTA would remain in effect.122 For New Zealand, it 
would almost certainly mean having to agree to exclusions—or at a 
minimum very long phase-ins—for dairy products.123 This is in stark 
contrast to the extant TPP agreement, which provided for the majority 
of tariffs to be removed entirely upon the TPP’s entry into force, and 
for any remaining tariffs to be reduced to zero by 2017.124 Indeed, in 
general, the United States’ proposed approach would likely lead to a 
lower level of market access than if the negotiations began from the 
standpoint of creating an across-the-board high-standards agreement. 
 This approach would probably make other countries less likely to 
want to join the TPP agreement. It is easier to negotiate to join a single 
agreement than to have to negotiate separate bilateral arrangements 
with each partner.125 Ironically, the United States’ negotiating stance 
will make it less likely to achieve its goal of forming an agreement that 
will expand into an APEC-wide FTA. In fact, what would arguably exist 
under the U.S. approach would not be a single unified FTA, but rather 
a series of spoke-and-wheel bilateral arrangements existing under a ve-
neer of commonality.126 
 In the context of multiple bilateral negotiations, one has to worry 
that the United States will not pursue the “high-standard, comprehen-
sive agreement”127 it purports to desire, but will instead succumb to 
domestic pressures and seek significant exclusions from some of the 
bilateral relationships. Indeed, the likely outcome if the United States 
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approach prevails is that the United States will negotiate bilateral 
agreements with New Zealand, Vietnam, and Brunei that are modeled 
on previous U.S. FTAs.128 
 In a recent report on trade agreements, the Government Account-
ability Office notes that “[o]ther countries that negotiate FTAs fre-
quently exclude sensitive industries or issues. Some trade experts argued 
that USTR’s pursuit of comprehensive agreements limits potential FTA 
partners since a number of larger economies are unwilling to enter into 
such comprehensive negotiations.”129 Although this is undoubtedly ac-
curate—for example, it would be difficult for the United States to 
achieve an FTA with Japan because of the exclusions Japan would pre-
sumably demand—it is equally true of the United States, which gener-
ally insists upon exclusions—or at a minimum, lengthy implementation 
periods—for various agricultural products.130 Therefore, it may well be 
that the TPP will merely appear on the surface to be a new paradigm, 
but will in fact represent business as usual. This would be a mistake on 
the United States’ part. Although it would be the easier negotiating path 
for the United States, it would be far less likely to achieve the strategic 
goals that made the TPP an attractive proposition in the first place. 
 For the TPP to serve as a model for a future FTAAP, it will have to 
be an agreement that other countries are interested in joining. The 
TPP agreement is not the only option available for Asia-Pacific regional-
ism, and if the TPP is not sufficiently attractive, one of the other visions 
for regional economic integration may instead fill the role as FTAAP 
model. China would like to see ASEAN + 3 serve this function, particu-
larly because it would exclude the United States.131 Japan prefers 
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ASEAN + 6 because it would include more economies to counterbal-
ance China, and would still exclude the United States.132 The TPP 
needs to be more attractive to potential partners than ASEAN + 3, 
ASEAN + 6, or any other potential regional models. If the TPP is clean-
er and more comprehensive, it will be a more attractive model because 
it will be relatively simple to incorporate other countries into the part-
nership. On the other hand, if bilateral agreements must be negotiated 
between every set of partners that do not already have a bilateral FTA, 
the negotiations will be highly burdensome and the outcomes will be 
less attractive. Thus the United States’ approach in the June negotia-
tions is worrisome, and suggests that the USTR does not have a clear 
idea of what its negotiation goals are, or should be.133 
 More recently, the United States has signaled it may be willing to 
compromise on this important negotiating issue. Following the June 
negotiations, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore have continued, in 
informal discussions, to push for multilateral market access negotia-
tions.134 Sources indicate that the parties are now searching for a middle 
ground, and that there is disagreement within the USTR regarding the 
best approach to pursue.135 Reports from the subsequent round of in-
tercessional talks in Peru are that this issue remains unresolved.136 
Hopefully USTR officials will reach agreement and recognize that a sig-
nificant value of the TPP would be that it provides a leadership role for 
the United States in an Asia-Pacific economic integration agreement, 
and that this role is unlikely to materialize if the TPP is merely an as-
semblage of bilateral agreements that are insufficiently comprehensive. 
Conclusion 
 The Obama administration is wise to negotiate for a Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. Such an agreement has the potential to re-assert the Unit-
ed States’ position as a leader and economic participant on both sides 
of the Pacific. It also represents the best chance, among the options 
otherwise in play, for the United States to play a role in shaping a fu-
ture Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). The TPP agreement 
has the potential to act as a building block toward further liberalization, 
                                                                                                                      
132 Masahiro Kawai Dean & Ganeshan Wignaraja, ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6: Which Way 
Forward?, Asian Dev. Bank Inst., at 10 (ADBI Discussion Paper No. 77, 2007), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/con_sep07_e/kawai_wignaraja_e.pdf. 
133 See TPP Negotiators to Seek Market Access Structure Deal at August Meeting, supra note 115. 
134 See TPP Countries Examining New Compromise Idea for Market Access Talks, supra note 122. 
135 See id. 
136 See TPP Members Examine Proposals in Peru, Do Not Reach Final Agreements, supra note 7. 
52 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:27 
and to multilateralize some of the fragmentation resulting from the 
panoply of FTAs today. 
 If a TPP agreement is reached in the form of one unified agree-
ment with common market access schedules, it will have a greater po-
tential to attract more participants and meaningfully reduce trade bar-
riers among a growing circle of nations. Nevertheless, there is a 
significant risk that the TPP will not live up to its potential. The more 
the TPP looks like a series of bilateral U.S. FTAs with exclusions for 
products the United States considers sensitive, the less likely the TPP 
will attract other countries to accede. Thus, the United States must 
carefully assess its goals for the TPP. Moreover, the United States must 
be careful not to shoot itself in the foot by following a “business as 
usual” approach, if it truly intends to create a high-standards agree-
ment that will be a model for an FTAAP. The traditional U.S. FTA 
model is not as likely as the model advocated by Australia, New Zea-
land, and Singapore, to achieve the result the USTR claims to be pursu-
ing. Nonetheless, it will be surprising if the United States agrees to di-
verge from its previous negotiating strategies and assent to the model 
advocated by Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. 
 There are a number of impediments that may torpedo the TPP 
agreement before it is concluded, and other factors that could render 
any agreement of no more significance than any other U.S. FTA. Never-
theless, the TPP agreement has the potential to become a new paradigm 
for trade agreements, to help the United States re-assert its position in 
the Asia-Pacific, and to begin the process of defragmenting interna-
tional trade. The potential payoffs are significant and important: hope-
fully the United States can resist the temptation to pursue “business as 
usual” —an approach that would actually undermine its strategic objec-
tives—and instead take the necessary steps to achieve those goals. 
